China’s Ministry of Commerce on Thursday voiced firm opposition to the U.S. government’s reported consideration of an additional 7.5 percent tariff on Chinese imports, calling the move a typical act of unilateralism and protectionism that politicizes trade issues, and reserving the right to take all necessary countermeasures.
Speaking at a regular press conference, ministry spokesperson Huang Ling said the United States has launched a Section 301 investigation into 16 economies, including China, under the pretext of “overcapacity.” “We will continue to closely follow and comprehensively assess any subsequent U.S. actions, and reserve the right to take all necessary measures to safeguard our legitimate rights and interests,” Huang told reporters.
The remarks came after Bloomberg reported Monday, citing people familiar with the matter, that the Trump administration is preparing to impose an additional 7.5 percent tariff on Chinese goods under its Section 301 investigation into structural manufacturing overcapacity. The White House has dismissed the report as baseless speculation, and sources cautioned that the specific rate has not been finalized.
According to the Bloomberg reporting, one option under consideration in Washington is to announce a higher headline duty while suspending a portion of it, effectively leaving the rate at 7.5 percent. The measure, if finalized, would be timed to land before the anticipated September 24 Xi–Trump summit in Washington.
A Rate Calibrated to the 20% Ceiling
The reported 7.5 percent figure is striking less for its size than for its precision. On July 27, China’s Ministry of Commerce disclosed that during bilateral trade consultations, the United States had committed that replacement tariffs on Chinese goods would not exceed 20 percent. The “forced labor” Section 301 tariff that took effect on July 24 already placed China at 12.5 percent in second-term replacement duties. Adding exactly 7.5 percentage points would bring the total to precisely 20 percent — consuming all the headroom beneath the ceiling, and no more.
Analysts widely read this arithmetic as a diplomatic signal: by landing at the ceiling rather than above it, the administration presents Beijing with a rate the Chinese side has already indicated it can absorb without treating the move as outright escalation. At the same time, it allows Washington to reconstruct its China tariff wall after the U.S. Supreme Court’s February ruling that struck down tariffs imposed under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA).
The overcapacity probe — formally launched by the Office of the United States Trade Representative in March 2026 — covers 16 of America’s largest trading partners, including the European Union, Japan, South Korea, Vietnam, India, Mexico and others. USTR Jamieson Greer has publicly acknowledged that overcapacity investigations are inherently more complex than the forced-labor probe and take longer to complete, with officials targeting a findings announcement before September 24.
Beijing’s Standing Response
Huang’s statement Thursday closely mirrored the template Beijing adopted after the July forced-labor tariffs. On July 27, the ministry rejected the U.S. framing of “forced labor,” noted that Washington has not ratified the 1930 Forced Labor Convention, and reiterated that China firmly opposes unilateral tariff actions while standing ready to resolve differences through dialogue.
That response also confirmed that China’s retaliatory measures against the first-round fentanyl and reciprocal tariffs remain in force, and that “alternative” tariffs are distinct from the original Section 301 tariffs imposed during Trump’s first term and extended under the Biden administration — meaning the actual cumulative tariff burden on Chinese goods will stand well above 20 percent even if the reported 7.5 percent addition is finalized.
“The US has launched a Section 301 investigation into 16 economies including China under the pretext of “overcapacity”, politicizing economic and trade issues. This is a typical act of unilateralism and protectionism, and China firmly opposes it. (美方以’产能过剩’为由对包括中国在内的16个经济体发起301调查，将经贸问题政治化，是典型的单边主义、保护主义行为，中方对此坚决反对。)”
— Ministry of Commerce spokesperson Huang Ling, August 27, 2026
What Comes Next
Two dates will dominate the near-term trajectory of U.S.–China trade relations. The first is the expected September 24 release of the overcapacity Section 301 findings, which Bloomberg reports the administration hopes to publish ahead of — or in tandem with — the Xi–Trump summit in Washington. The second is November 10, when the current one-year bilateral trade truce expires. Failure to extend that truce would remove the 20 percent constraint on replacement tariffs altogether, opening the door to escalation the market has not yet priced in.
For now, Beijing’s posture is one of measured firmness: a clear rejection of the “overcapacity” premise, a reaffirmation of its right to respond, and a continuing willingness to talk. Whether the 7.5 percent becomes a formal announcement, a suspended headline rate, or a bargaining chip traded away in exchange for other concessions will hinge on the closed-door dynamics of the coming weeks — and on whether the two sides can find, in the ministry’s own words, a way to “compress the problem list and lengthen the cooperation list.”
The reported tariff, if implemented as described, would complete the administration’s reconstruction of its China trade-pressure toolkit six months after the Supreme Court demolished the legal foundation of the original structure — replacing IEEPA-derived duties with a layered, Section 301-backed architecture that is more resistant to judicial challenge and, at least for now, carefully calibrated to the limits of the existing truce.